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Non-Technical Summary
Systemic risk is one of the main reasons why banks are regulated and supervised.
The integration of financial markets in the EU – not just since the introduction of the
euro – has increased the systemic risk potential at the European level. The
divergence between this increase in EU-wide systemic risk and the current national
based supervisory structure calls for a reform of the European supervisory
framework. In particular, the following questions emerge: Is there a need for a truly
European supervisory framework? And, how should a potential European supervisor
be organised?
A milestone in the political discussion has been a report by the Economic and
Financial Committee (EFC) which will probably lay the basis for a future
supervisory structure in the EU. According to this report the Lamfalussy framework
is to be extended to the banking sector based on the existing international
agreements. The new structure aims on speeding up EU legislation, strengthening
cooperation between national supervisors, and promoting convergence of
supervisory practice.
The aims of this paper are twofold: First, to describe the existing supervisory
arrangements both at the national and at the European level as well as the proposed
structure for a future supervisory arrangement. Second, the arrangements are
evaluated with respect to an increased systemic risk potential at the European level.
We conclude the following: Monitoring, i.e. supervision of individual institutions is
best carried out at the level closest to the financial intermediaries concerned, i.e. the
national level. However, the increased EU-wide systemic risk calls for greater
cooperation between national supervisors. This task may be fulfilled by the new
framework.
With regard to crisis management: Although there is no explicit European lender of
last resort (LOLR) the Eurosystem can be regarded as an implicit LOLR having the
necessary capacity and willingness to act when really needed. Nevertheless, more
transparency concerning the decision process seems to be preferable and would well
be consistent with constructive ambiguity.
In addition, EU-wide systemic risk calls for a European observatory of systemic
risk. Simple cooperation between national supervisors even in the new framework
will not be sufficient for safeguarding financial stability. A revised and more
powerful Banking Supervision Committee could fulfil this task. Such a committee
would be essential with regard to crisis prevention and could also be valuable for
optimising the use of the LOLR when it becomes unavoidable.
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Abstract
The systemic risk potential in the European banking market has increased. Hence,
the following questions emerge: Is there a need for a truly European supervisory
framework? And, how should a potential European supervisor be organised? This
paper evaluates the existing supervisory framework as well as the recent proposal by
the Economic and Financial Committee of the EU with respect to the increased
Europe-wide systemic risk. We argue that cooperation between national supervisors
even in the new framework will not be sufficient for safeguarding financial stability.
As a consequence, we argue in favour of a European observatory of systemic risk.
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21 Introduction
The arrangements for the supervision of financial markets in Europe are
changing. At the national level countries like the UK, Germany and Austria
recently installed integrated supervisory agencies replacing different former
specialised authorities for banking, insurance and securities. At the European
level there is one decisive question: Is there a need for a truly European
supervisory framework? And, how should a potential European supervisor be
organised? Just recently the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) of the
European Union (EU) submitted a report on Financial Regulation, Supervision
and Stability (EFC, 2002), which was endorsed by the Council of Economic and
Finance Ministers (Ecofin), and which will probably lay the basis for future
supervisory and regulatory arrangements in the EU. According to this report the
arrangements that are already in place for securities regulation (Lamfalussy
model) are to be extended to the other financial sectors based on existing inter-
institutional agreements. However, the question remains whether these
arrangements are sufficient for safeguarding the stability of financial markets.
Apart from this there is still controversy on the involvement of central banks in
supervisory structure.
In the discussion it has to be distinguished between the cross-sector and the
cross-border dimension. In this paper we focus primarily on the cross-border
dimension in banking. Since financial stability is still and primarily a question of
the stability of credit institutions (Meister, 2002: 3), it seems to be appropriate to
focus on the supervision and regulation of banks.1
There are two main arguments for the regulation and supervision of banks:2
consumer protection and the existence of systemic risk in the banking market.
Due to information asymmetries consumers are not in the position to judge the
safety and soundness of financial institutions. Thus, protection is necessary since
the institution where consumers hold their funds may fail which would cause
losses to the individual depositor. Furthermore, agency problems may result in
                                          
1 For a good discussion on the pros and cons of an integrated financial services supervision
see, e.g., Abrams and Taylor (2002).
2 For a detailed argumentation of the rationale for the regulation and supervision of banks see,
e.g., Spong (1994), Goodhart et al. (1998) and Llewellyn (1999). For a discussion on
whether the financial system should be regulated at all see, e.g., Dowd (1996), Benston and
Kaufman (1996) and Dow (1996).
3adverse behaviour, i.e. unsatisfactory conduct of business of a firm with its
clients.3
Systemic risk is the other reason why banks are regulated and supervised.
Systemic risk means an externality whereby the failure of a single institution
may lead to the failure of other institutions and to the breakdown of the entire
system.4 The banking sector is viewed as more vulnerable to contagion than
other industries since banks are viewed as more susceptible to failures (Kaufman
1995, 1996, Goodhart et al., 1998, de Bandt and Hartmann, 2000).
According to the goals of supervision one can differentiate between prudential
and conduct of business supervision (Llewwellyn, 1999). Prudential supervision
focuses on the solvency and safety and soundness of financial institutions
whereas the focus of conduct of business supervision lies on how financial firms
conduct business with their customers. In this study we concentrate on
prudential supervision and neglect conduct of business issues. Thus, whenever
supervision is mentioned, more precisely prudential supervision is meant.
Measures to facilitate the objectives of consumer protection and stability in the
financial system can be viewed as a three-part structure. The first part of the
structure is regulation. The regulatory framework lays down the rules governing
the behaviour of banks and other financial institutions. The second part is
monitoring. Monitoring ensures the banks’ compliance with the regulations. The
third part is the safety net. If banks are in financial difficulties, the safety net
limits the effects upon third parties. The safety net comprises deposit insurance
and the lender of last resort (LOLR) function, usually provided by the central
bank. Supervision is the more general observation of the behaviour of financial
firms.5
The aims of this study are the following: First, to describe the existing
supervisory arrangements both at the national and at the European level as well
as the proposed structure for a future supervisory arrangement. Second, the
arrangements are evaluated with respect to an increased systemic risk potential
at the European level. We argue that cooperation between national supervisors
even in the new framework will not be sufficient for safeguarding financial
                                          
3 Note that there is, therefore, a case for regulation and supervision even in the absence of
systemic risk, e.g. in the case of insurance companies.
4 For a more profound definition and a good survey of systemic risk see, e.g., de Bandt and
Hartmann (2000).
5 Our notional distinction between regulation and supervision is in line with, e.g., Goodhart et
al. (1998) and Llewellyn (1999). There is a widely used practice of referring to the
authorities responsible for bank supervision interchangeably as supervisors and regulators.
4stability. As a consequence, we argue in favour of a European observatory of
systemic risk.
The paper is organised as follows: The next section gives an overview of
systemic risk in European banking and how to deal with it. Section 3 describes
the supervisory framework in the EU and section 4 tries to assess whether this
framework is appropriate in safeguarding stability in the EU banking market.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Systemic Risk and Banking Supervision
2.1 Systemic Risk in European Banking
Systemic risk is one of the main reasons why banks are regulated and
supervised. It is often argued that the ongoing integration of financial markets in
the EU – not just since the introduction of the euro – has increased
interdependencies among financial institutions and, hence, the potential for
systemic risk (e.g., Aglietta, 1999, Speyer, 2001, ECB, 2001, Padoa-Schioppa,
2002). The failure of a bank may have not just negative consequences for other
banks in the same country, but may also result in breakdowns of banks in other
countries. A national based supervisory structure may lack capability to assess
negative cross-border externalities and thus provide an insufficient level of
supervision. The empirical assessment of the systemic risk potential in Europe is
therefore essential when shaping and evaluating the future supervisory
framework.
There is a wide theoretical literature on systemic risk starting from the classical
bank run models following Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and extensions of these
models of single banks’ fragility to models of multiple bank systems, leading to
the modern bank contagion literature.6
However, so far there is little empirical evidence on the potential for systemic
risk in Europe.7 Schüler (2002), and Schröder and Schüler (2003) try to assess
the threat of systemic risk in European banking using correlations between stock
returns of European banks and bank stock index returns, respectively.
Correlations between bank stock returns are an indication for the
                                          
6 For a good survey on the theoretical as well as the empirical literature on systemic risk see
de Bandt and Hartmann (2000).
7 One reason for this might be the lack of appropriate data on e.g. interbank lending for
Europe. There are some studies (Michael, 1998, Angelini et al., 1996, Sheldon and Maurer,
1998) that try to assess the potential threat stemming form interbank lending at the national
level.
5interdependencies between banks. Such interdependencies are a prerequisite for
externalities between banks and thus for systemic risk to exist.8 Schüler (2002)
calculates rolling-window correlations between bank stock returns of the 60
largest European banks, after controlling for national influences in bank stock
returns. Schröder and Schüler (2003) estimate bivariate GARCH models
between excess returns of bank stock indexes of 13 European countries. They,
first, test for structural breaks in 1994, as a consequence of the second banking
directive, and in 1999, the introduction of the euro. Second, they test for
significance of a trend variable in the covariance equation of the GARCH
model. The empirical results of these studies give some evidence that the
systemic risk potential at the European level has increased and that there exists a
significant Europe-wide threat of systemic risk.
These findings pose the question whether the supervisory structure in the EU is
able to cope with this increase in systemic risk. We try to answer this question in
section 4.
2.2 Dealing with Systemic Risk
In addressing the threat of systemic risk in banking prudential supervision plays
an important role. In general, there are a number of different ways to deal with
systemic risk (Davis, 1992, Bartholomew and Whalen, 1995, Kaufman and
Scott, 2000, Canoy et al., 2001, Summer, 2002). First, there are measures that
try to reduce the likelihood of potential shocks, i.e. that try to avoid the trigger
that may cause a systemic crisis. A second strategy is to limit contagion. And
finally, there is crisis management and healing. In particular, the main measures
are the following:
 Capital regulation: According to the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision banks are required to hold an adequate proportion of capital in
relation to the riskiness of their asset portfolio. Setting minimum capital
requirements is a regulatory mean of shifting the risks borne by the
depositors or insured by the safety nets (LOLR and deposit insurance) back
to the shareholders. Hence, moral hazard and the incentive of excessive risk
taking is reduced.
 Disclosure requirements: Adequate disclosure of information helps to reduce
information problems (adverse selection and moral hazard) between investors
and banks. In this way it enables the market to discipline the bank, and hence
should limit excessive risk taking.
                                          
8 This approach in assessing the systemic risk potential follows De Nicolo and Kwast (2002).
6 Liquidity and reserve requirements: In order to meet the demand for cash
banks may be required to hold a certain ratio of liquid assets like cash, short-
term and marketable assets. Such liquidity requirements as well as the
requirement to hold reserves in the form of cash or balance at the central
bank reduce the likelihood of liquidity shortage following deposit
withdrawals.
 Large exposure rules: Since a large exposure to a firm, sector or country can
make a bank vulnerable if the firm, sector or country gets in trouble
supervising and also regulating (in the form of limits in relation to the bank’s
capital) such large exposures can limit systemic risk.
 Deposit insurance: In the case of a bank failure the government implicitly or
explicitly guarantees some or all bank liabilities. Thus, the incentives of
depositors to run a bank are reduced. Usually, there are limits to coverage to
avoid insuring all of the system including wholesale depositors who should
not suffer from severe information asymmetries.
 Lender of last resort (LOLR): The central bank can operate as a LOLR either
by giving liquidity assistance to an individual bank or by maintaining
liquidity to the system as a whole, i.e. via a general monetary policy
expansion. By doing so it prevents a liquidity problem to become a solvency
problem.
Regulations such as disclosure or certain capital requirements are part of
banking supervision. Both on- and off-site examinations are used to monitor the
banking system and to enforce the banks’ compliance with the regulations such
as capital adequacy. Banking regulation and monitoring primarily attempt to
decrease the likelihood that individual banks fail. In contrast, the LOLR function
as well as deposit insurance schemes are government safety net measures that
aim on investors/depositors protection and try to reduce the likelihood of
damaging runs and contagion. Recapitulating, prudential banking supervision
comprises regulations, monitoring and crisis management.9
Costs of Banking Supervision
Clearly, the above measures may help to reduce the threat of systemic risk.
However, they only come with certain costs – direct ones such as salaries for
supervisors and administrative costs at banks, and indirect ones, i.e. through
distortions to the normal functioning of the financial markets (Goodhart, 1988,
                                          
9 Note that often the notions supervision and monitoring are used interchangeable so that
regulation, supervision and crisis management stand in a way side by side. This is just a
notional difference. One may think of monitoring as supervision in a narrower sense.
7Franks et al., 1999, Canoy et al., 2001). Especially the LOLR function and the
deposit insurance encourage banks to take excessive risks and thus create moral
hazard.10 This moral hazard problem is inseparable from the existence of safety
nets like the LOLR and deposit insurance and strengthens the need for
supervision (Bartholomew and Whalen, 1995).
In general, government intervention is only justified when the presence of
systemic risk constitutes a market failure. With systemic risk the key market
failure is a breakdown of information (Mishkin, 1995). That is, that financial
markets are unable to channel funds effectively to those who have the most
productive investment opportunities because of an increase in information
problems (adverse selection and moral hazard) that is due to a disruption in
financial markets. The government should always be highly sensitive to whether
its actions are undermining or reinforcing the private market incentives that limit
systemic risk (Kaufman, 1996).
3 Banking Supervision in the EU
In the European Union the institutional arrangements for the supervision of
financial markets are based on the principles of home country control and
mutual recognition as well as cooperation among the national supervisory
authorities (ECB, 2000, Lannoo, 2002). According to the home country
principle every bank has the right to do business in the whole euro area using a
single license, under the supervision of the authority that has issued the license.
Cooperation takes place both at a bilateral and multilateral level.
3.1 The National Arrangements
Institutional banking supervision arrangements in the EU Member States can be
distinguished by the degree of cross-sectoral integration and central bank
involvement.
The recent establishment of integrated financial supervisory agencies in the UK
(October 1997), Austria (April 2002) and Germany (May 2002) significantly
changes the balance of supervisory arrangements: One third of the EU Member
States have now combined their financial market supervision in a single
agency.11 Of the remaining ten countries, four have a combined banking and
                                          
10 For a more detailed discussion of the moral hazard problem associated with the LOLR and
the deposit insurance as well as the “too-big-to-fail” problem see, e.g., Kaufman (1996),
Kaufman and Scott (2000), Herring and Santomero (2000), and Canoy et al. (2001).
11 Besides the UK, Austria and Germany, Denmark and Sweden have an integrated financial
market supervisor.
8securities sector supervision. Six countries have three separate authorities for the
supervision of the banking, securities and insurance sectors.
Traditionally, the National Central Banks (NCB) have played a significant role
in banking supervision and have often been the sole body responsible for
banking supervision. All five Member States with integrated financial
supervision have separated financial sector supervision from the NCB.
Similarly, banking and securities markets supervisors in Belgium, Finland and
Luxembourg are independent of the respective NCB. Seven Member States
continue to delegate supervisory authority exclusively to the NCB (Greece,
Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) or allow for significant central
bank involvement (France). In countries without direct central bank
responsibility for banking supervision, close cooperation between the supervisor
and the central bank remains in place. This cooperation often takes the form of
board participation and regular committee meetings of high-level representatives
from both institutions. In addition, mostly central banks are closely involved in
the operational conduct of supervisory duties. Table 1 summarises the
institutional national supervisory arrangements. Table A1 gives a more detailed
description of the national supervisory agencies.
Table 1 – Institutional arrangements for the supervision of financial market at the national
level
Integrated supervisor Securities & banking
supervisor
Specialised banking
supervisor
Austria Belgium France – NCB
Denmark Finland Greece – NCB
Germany Ireland – NCB Italy – NCB
Sweden Luxembourg The Netherlands – NCB
United Kingdom Portugal – NCB
Spain – NCB
NCB: National Central Bank fully or partially responsible for banking supervision.
3.2 The Internationalisation of Banking Supervision
As a consequence of the increase in the EU-wide systemic risk potential,
addressing the threat of systemic risk by supervision at a national level alone
seems to be no longer a viable approach. So far there exist some international
banking regulations and also some form of co-ordination of national supervisors.
9In particular, there is the Basel committee on banking supervision, cooperation
at the bilateral level and multilateral bodies.12
3.2.1 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
The purpose of the Basel Committee on banking supervision is to set
international standards and coordinate the work of national regulators. The Basel
Committee does not possess any formal supranational supervisory authority.
Rather, it formulates broad supervisory standards and guidelines and
recommends statements of best practice in the expectation that individual
authorities will take steps to implement them through detailed arrangements –
statutory or otherwise – which are best suited to their own national systems. In
this way, the Committee encourages convergence towards common approaches
and common standards without attempting detailed harmonisation of member
countries' supervisory techniques.
3.2.2 Cooperation at the Bilateral Level
Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) provide the underpinning for cooperation
at the bilateral level. MoU are bilateral agreements between banking supervisory
authorities to safeguard financial stability. MoU establish a practical framework
for regular exchange of information and define procedures and reciprocal
commitments. Nearly all EU Member States have signed MoU with each other.
By the end of 1999, some 90 MoU were in place within the EU governing the
exchange of information regarding the supervision of cross-border banking
activities (Lannoo, 2002).
3.2.3 Exchange of Information in Multilateral Bodies
At the European level there exist several committees to promote cooperation
between supervisory authorities (ECB, 2000, European Commission, 2000a,
Lannoo, 2002). Namely there is the Groupe de Contact (GdC), the Banking
Advisory Committee (BAC), and the Banking Supervision Committee (BSC).
The Groupe de Contact
The GdC, established in 1972, was the first European banking supervisors’
committee. The GdC is composed of mid-management banking supervisors
from all 18 EEA member states.13 It meets at least three times a year.
                                          
12 For a more detailed description of the supervisory authorities at the European level see, e.g.,
Lannoo (2000), ECB (2000), Speyer (2001), Lannoo (2002).
13 The European Economic Area (EEA) includes, besides the 15 EU countries, Norway,
Iceland and Liechtenstein.
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The GdC was established as an informal group to promote practical cooperation
and information exchange amongst national banking supervisors within the
EEA. All members must be involved in the day-to-day supervision of banks.
The GdC discusses developments in supervisory systems from the perspective of
the hands-on supervisor.
The GdC is independent in setting its agenda. However, it may examine and
prepare reports for the BAC and the BSC at its own initiative or upon request
from those committees. The GdC prepares regular overviews of the solvency
and profitability of the EU banking system for the BAC and is assisting the BAC
in the review of the regulatory capital regime.
The Banking Advisory Committee
The BAC was established ‘alongside the Commission’ in 1978. Members
include representatives from banking supervisory authorities, Finance Ministries
of the Member States and the Commission (Internal Market DG). It meets four
times a year.14
The BAC has to fulfil four specific tasks. First, it assists and advises the
Commission on proposals regarding further co-ordination in the banking sector.
This includes authorisation requirements for banks, bank supervision,
cooperation of supervisory authorities, procedures of cross-border banking
activities and deposit insurance schemes. Second, the BAC is responsible to
establish ratios for the solvency, liquidity and profitability of credit institutions
(cf. GdC). Third, it assists in the implementation of EU Banking Directives.
Fourth, the BAC advises the Commission on possible follow-ups to the
implementation of the directives.
The BAC considers broad prudential regulatory issues, it does not examine
specific problems of individual credit institutions. Unless the Commission
decides otherwise, all discussions and conclusions remain confidential.
The Banking Supervision Committee
The BSC of the ESCB comprises high-level representatives from Member
States’ NCBs and the banking supervisory authorities from states where the
supervisory role is not fulfilled by the central bank. The ECB is represented. The
Commission (Internal Market DG and Financial Institutions Directorate) and the
Groupe de Contact participate as observers. The BSC meets five times a year.
                                          
14 Clear indications regarding participants, meeting frequency and tasks are given in the EU
directive setting up the BAC (77/78/EEC).
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The BSC fulfils two roles. Firstly, it assists the ESCB in its statutory tasks in the
area of banking supervision and stability of the financial system. Secondly, the
BSC is a forum where high level EU banking supervisors exchange views and
information regarding systemic issues and possible implications for the conduct
of supervision. The BSC examines the banking sector from a macro-prudential
perspective.
There is an intense discussion – not just in the literature but also in politics – as
to how these existing international institutions are able to cope with the
increasing globalisation in banking and finance (e.g., Goodhart et al., 1998,
Aglietta, 1999, Speyer, 2001, Lannoo, 2002). Often there are claims for a single
European supervisor or at least for more cooperation between national
supervisors. Politics has responded to the discussion and made a proposal which
will probably lay the basis for future supervisory arrangements in the EU.
3.3 Proposed Reform of the Supervisory Arrangements in the EU
In April 2002 the finance ministers of Germany and Britain, Hans Eichel and
Gordon Brown, launched a joint initiative to reform banking supervision in the
EU. They initially proposed the creation of a modern, effective supervisory
structure at the European level, in which final responsibility would lie with the
national governments. This initial proposal was intensively discussed and
criticised, especially by central bankers who saw their influence on banking
supervision to be cut back.
Based on this proposal the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers of the
EU (Ecofin) mandated the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC)15 to assess
and report on possible arrangements for financial regulation and supervision. A
final report on financial regulation, supervision and stability was submitted in
October 2002 (EFC, 2002).16 At the moment, there is still intense discussion
with the European Parliament that is insisting on the right to “call-back” or to
look again at implementing legislation not conforming to its wishes.
Nevertheless, the final report by the EFC will most likely lay the basis for future
supervisory and regulatory arrangements in the EU.
According to this report the arrangements that are already in place for securities
regulation (“Lamfalussy model”) are to be extended to the other financial
                                          
15 The Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) was established in 1999. It advises the
Commission and the Council on issues concerning the economic and financial situation in
the EU.
16 Note the proposal by the EFC refers to supervision and regulation of financial markets,
comprising banking, insurance and securities.
12
sectors based on the existing inter-institutional agreements. Contrary to the
initial Eichel/Brown-proposal, this proposal includes the central banks in
banking supervision, at least to a certain extent.
According to the Lamfalussy model legislation is split into framework principles
(level 1) and implementing measures (level 2). Besides, cooperation between
supervisors is strengthened to improve implementation (level 3). At level 4, the
Commission checks Member States compliance with EU legislation and may
take legal action against Member State suspected a breach of community law.
According to the proposal by the EFC the following supervisory structure would
be implemented (see figure 1).
- insert figure 1 about here -
Sectoral specificities are recognised by three separate sectoral committees each
at levels 2 and 3: for banking, insurance (including pensions), and securities
(including UCITS). In addition, a fourth committee at level 2 would be
established to deal with specific issues concerning financial conglomerates.
At level 1, the Commission adopts a formal proposals for a directive/regulation
after a full consultation process with the European Parliament and the Council of
Ministers. The key political choices to be taken by the Parliament and the
Council on the basis of the Commission’s proposal are reflected in the
framework principles. They determine the political direction and orientation, the
fundamentals of each decision.
At level 2, committees act as regulatory committees in line with the 1999
Council comitology decision.17 Level 2 committees also provide advise to the
Commission, e.g. on draft legislative texts. Each committee is chaired by the
commission and each Member State has one voting representative and one
supporting technical expert, both nominated by the relevant Ministry. The chair
of the respective level 3 committee has observer status without voting power. In
the level 2 committees for banking and financial conglomerates, additionally,
the ECB has observer status. Level 2 committees can occasionally meet in joint
format at a high level to consider difficult technical and cross-sectoral cases and
improve synergies and coherence of level 2 rules.
At level 3, the committees fulfil three tasks: First, advise the Commission, in
particular on its preparation of draft level 2 measures. Second, promote
                                          
17 Comitology refers to the delegation of implementing powers by the Council to the
Commission for the execution of EU legislation. Representatives of the Member States,
acting through comitology committees (level 2 committees) assist the Commission in the
execution of the implementing powers conferred on it.
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consistent implementation of EU directives, supervisory convergence and best
practice in Member States. And third, provide an effective operational network
to enhance day-to-day supervision, including exchange of information. Voting
members are the respective national supervisory authority of each Member State
that also chair and provide the secretariat. Central Banks without direct
supervisory responsibilities including the ECB also participate in the level 3
banking committee. However, the competent supervisory agency holds the vote.
Representatives from the Banking Supervision Committee (BSC) and the
Groupe the Contact have observer status in the level 3 banking committee. The
Commission has observer status in all level 3 committees. The Groupe the
Contact continues its activities and also acts as the main working group of the
level 3 banking committee including for confidential exchange of information.
The Banking Advisory Committee (BAC) is reformed into the level 2 banking
committee. Functions of the current BAC which are not transferred to the level 2
committee are allocated to the level 3 banking committee.
Besides the legislative process, a reconfigured Financial Sector Policy Group
(FSPG) provides political oversight on financial market issues for the benefit of
the Ecofin Council.18 It fills the gap between the political and technical
regulatory levels and provides for cross-sectoral strategic reflection. This
committee has a “policy-shaping” role which includes the following: First,
defining the medium- and long-term strategy for financial services issues, e.g.
for the post-FSAP19 period. Second, considering “hot” short-term issues, such as
terrorist financing, reinsurance and issues related to the current FSAP phase.
Third, assessing progress and implementation, e.g. of the current FSAP. Political
advise and oversight are provided on both internal issues (e.g. single market)
and external issues (e.g. enlargement issues). The committee reports to the EFC
to assist its preparation of advise to the Council. Members of the committee are
one high-level representative of the relevant Ministry per Member State, and one
alternate. In addition, the Commission chair of the level 2 committees has full
membership. The ECB and the level 3 committees chairs are observers.
Additionally, the reconfigured FSPG in a special format contributes to the
EFC’s work on issues related to financial stability and their economic
consequences. To this end, the level 3 committee chairs, the ECB and the
                                          
18 The Financial Services Policy Group (FSPG) first met in January 1999. In the context of
work to establish the single market for financial services, the Ecofin Council asked the
FSPG to examine where new legal initiatives would be required, where existing provisions
had to be adapted to new developments, where existing provisions needed to be simplified
and where these should be more coherent.
19 The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), laid out in 1999, seeks to push financial market
integration in over 40 different areas. It is scheduled to be fully implemented by 2005.
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Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG Ecfin) are granted
full member status in this special section. The BSC chairman participates as
observer and regularly reports on macro-prudential developments.
4 Are the Arrangements Adequate to Deal with Systemic
Risk?
As mentioned above ensuring the safety and soundness of the financial system
includes a variety of measures. In general, prudential supervision comprises
regulations, such as capital regulation, monitoring, i.e. the enforcement of
banks’ compliance with the regulations, and crisis management, i.e. the safety
nets deposit insurance and LOLR.
The Lamfalussy framework on which the EFC proposal is based, refers
primarily to the legislative process, i.e. regulatory issues. Among other things,
the goal is to speed up EU legislation so that financial regulation is able to adapt
quickly to new market developments and practices. In addition, the proposed
framework aims at promoting convergence of supervisory practices and
consistent implementation of EU directives. Furthermore, with regard to
regulations there are the Basel capital requirements that already constitute some
form of international regulation.
In terms of monitoring, certainly, supervision of individual institutions is best
carried out at the level closest to the financial intermediaries concerned, i.e. at
the national level (Meister, 2002, Lejsek, 2002, EFC, 2002). National
supervisors have sufficient experience of the regional markets as well as of the
supervised entities. In a very practical sense they can get in contact with the
persons and institutions more easily. Nevertheless, increased interdependencies
of banks across countries requires enhanced co-ordination and cooperation
between national supervisors. The proposed framework may help to share
information between national supervisors and central banks which is needed to
monitor the potential for systemic risk at the EU level. Furthermore, the new
framework may help to align supervisory practices which is also crucial for
supervising multinational banks.
However, there remain doubts as to whether the new framework based on the
existing arrangements is adequate for the safeguarding of financial stability in
the case of a crisis. Crisis management comprises deposit insurance and the
lender of last resort (LOLR) function. In all EU countries explicit deposit
insurance schemes are in place and administered either officially (by the
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government or the central bank) or privately.20 Deposit insurance schemes are
compulsory for all banks in the EU and have a clear jurisdiction of who is
refunding deposits in the case of a bank failure. There is no difference between
domestic and foreign depositors. Thus, there is no need for a European deposit
insurance scheme.
Lender of Last Resort and Central Bank Involvement
In contrast to deposit insurance the LOLR issue is not that clear cut. Who would
give liquidity assistance in the case of a major bank failure causing systemic risk
at the European level, i.e. threatening banks also in other countries? Does
Europe need an explicit LOLR? Could the ECB possibly be such a LOLR – or is
there already an implicit European LOLR?21 Before turning to the European
situation, we sketch the pros and cons of the combination of central banking and
banking supervision.22
Arguments in Favour of Combining
One advantage of having banking supervision within the central bank is to
exploit synergies between central banking and prudential supervision. Synergies
may arise in two respects: First, central banks’ knowledge of the overall
economy and financial system, as well as their information from the payment
and settlement systems and monetary policy operations, are valuable for the
performance of the supervisory tasks. Second, supervisory information can play
an important role in the oversight of payment and settlement systems and of
market infrastructures, and in managing liquidity crisis.23
Another argument is the central bank’s concern for the systemic stability of the
financial system. There is a close relationship between prudential controls of
individual institutions and the assessment of risks for the financial system as a
                                          
20 For a detailed description of deposit insurance schemes see Demirguc-Kunt and Sobaci
(2000), Gropp and Vesala (2001), Huizinga and Nicodème (2002).
21 Note that so far we did not explicitly differentiate between Europe, the EU and the
eurozone. Throughout the paper the notions Europe and EU are used interchangeable. Of
course the ECB is only competent for the monetary policy of the eurozone.
22 For a more detailed discussion on the pros and cons for central bank involvement in
banking supervision see, e.g., Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993, 1995), Haubrich (1996),
Goodhart (2000).
23 For the U.S., Peek et al. (1999) find that supervisory information does affect monetary
policy, and does so in the correct direction. Their results support the idea that supervisory
information allows more accurate estimates of economic activity and inflationary pressures
to be achieved, thereby favouring the choice of a more appropriate stance for monetary
policy.
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whole. In this context another point emerges. In order to fulfil its LOLR
function the central bank needs to have access to information on the solvency
and liquidity of banks in a timely manner. This becomes particularly important
in times of financial distress.24 Furthermore, the protection of the payment
system which is under the responsibility of the central bank, is a crucial task
retarding systemic risk.
Finally, there is the independence argument. The often strong guarantee of
independence of the central bank may enhance the bank supervisors ability to
enforce actions.
Arguments in Favour of Separation
The main argument against central bank involvement in banking supervision is a
conflict of interest between the two functions. In order to avoid adverse effects
on the financial health of banks, and hence on financial stability, the central
bank may pursue a more accommodating monetary policy than warranted for the
pursuance of price stability.
Furthermore, the combination of functions bears a risk of loss of central bank
reputation. Occurring bank failures may hurt the central bank’s global
credibility. The private sector might expect that the central bank might be
influenced by financial system stability considerations when determining
monetary policy. Reduced credibility could result in higher inflation
expectations, which in turn might increase inflation itself.25
Finally, it is argued that banking supervision within the central bank results in an
excessive concentration of power in the central bank.
The European Situation – Do We Need a European LOLR?
In respect to the involvement of the central bank in banking supervision, Europe
is unique in the sense that since the introduction of the euro the jurisdiction of
monetary policy and of banking supervision do not coincide. According to the
ECB (2001) this has changed the balance of the arguments considerably.
Arguments against central bank involvement have lost most of their weight,
while those in favour have become even more prominent. In particular, the
increasing relevance of the systemic focus speaks in favour of an involvement of
                                          
24 Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) find that in countries in which the central bank is the
supervisory authority there were less bank failures.
25 Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999) find empirical evidence that the inflation rate is higher and
more volatile in countries where the responsibility for banking supervision is entirely
placed within the central bank.
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the central banks. NCBs may benefit from their traditional concern for systemic
stability and from their composite nature – they are components of the
Eurosystem and, simultaneously, a national institution. Furthermore, conflicts of
interests and concentration of power are not a real concern due to the
institutional separation of monetary and supervisory jurisdiction.
In view of crisis management the LOLR function is of crucial importance. The
ECB does not carry out banking supervision, nor does it have a mandate as a
European LOLR. The contribution of the ECB to financial stability is mentioned
under the article 105(5) of the Treaty, according to which “the ESCB shall
contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent
authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the
stability of the financial system.” Certainly, this draft is ambiguous. The
responsibility is diffused and the “competent authorities” are not named.
The ambiguity regarding crisis management has also lead to the so-called
Brouwer reports (European Commission, 2000b, 2001) that were prepared by
the Economic and Financial Committee under the chairmanship of Henk
Brouwer from De Nederlandsche Bank. The outcome of these reports was that
the current system based on national responsibility is appropriate, but there is a
need to strengthen cross-border and cross-sectoral cooperation between
supervisors, to enhance convergence of supervisory practices and to reinforce
collaboration and cooperation between supervisors and central banks. These
tasks may be achieved by the proposed new framework.
There is criticism that the absence of a clear and transparent LOLR that would
act in an emergency raises doubts in the markets about the ability of the
Eurosystem to handle crisis situations (e.g., Aglietta, 1999). According to
Padoa-Schioppa (1999) this criticism is not justified. His argumentation is
threefold: Firstly, this criticism reflects a notion of LOLR operations that is
largely outdated. Padoa-Schioppa argues that due to deposit insurance, large
exposure rules and other supervisory measures, contagion from an insolvent to a
solvent institution has become very unlikely. In addition, a rapid outflow of
uninsured interbank liabilities would be absorbed by the width and depth of
today’s interbank market. Thus, it is extremely unlikely that a solvent bank
becomes illiquid and at the same time lacks sufficient collateral to obtain regular
central bank funding. Secondly he argues, that the criticism underestimates the
Eurosystem’s capacity to act. Not to declare explicitly beforehand the
procedures of emergency actions may even be advisable since it may help to
reduce the moral hazard associated with the safety net. This policy of
“constructive ambiguity” was also stressed out by Duisenberg (1999). And
thirdly, the criticism represents too mechanistic a view of how a crisis is, and
should be, managed in practice. Deviation from normal times procedures and
rules is allowed and even required in the case of an emergency.
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Furthermore, Padoa-Schioppa (1999) stresses that besides the central bank
money solution to a financial crisis there are also alternative arrangements to
provide money. In particular these are private money solution and funds raised
with taxes. Certainly there is no doubt that the LOLR must be confined to play a
minor role. However, these alternative solutions “are costly and can in general
be at least part of a solution in which the central bank is also involved.” (Vives,
2001: 76)
There exists no explicit European LOLR and as argued by Padoa-Schioppa
(1999) there may also be no requirement for it – at least not at present.
Nevertheless, there may already exist an implicit European LOLR. The 1999
Annual Report of the ECB disclosed that in case of emergency a bank could rely
on the so called emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) (Scacciavillani et al.,
2002). The ELA comprises the support given by the NCB to temporarily illiquid
institutions. ELA is only given “in exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-
case basis“. The competent NCB takes the decision concerning the provision of
ELA to an institution operating in its jurisdiction. All the costs associated with
the provision of the ELA must be borne by the NCB. Any provision of ELA that
would endanger price stability could be sterilised by the ECB. In its Annual
report the ECB stresses that “central bank support should not be seen as a
primary means for ensuring financial stability, since it bears the risk of moral
hazard.” (p. 98) However, it is clearly stated that “if and when appropriate, the
necessary mechanisms to tackle a financial crisis are in place.” (p. 98) This is in
line with a statement given by Wim Duisenberg (1999) and with the view of
Padoa-Schioppa (1999) that the Eurosystem would have the necessary capacity
to act when really needed and that a clear reassurance about the capacity to act
should be sufficient for the markets. This view is also supported by the reactions
to September 11, 2001 where the ECB acted to guarantee the availability of
dollars to cover the needs arising in the financial system (Scacciavillani et al.,
2002).
Vives (2001: 70) argues that ad hoc co-ordination in crisis situations will not be
sufficient and may endanger the stability of the system. As a consequence, he
urges for a centralised LOLR authority, namely the ECB.
The discussion on whether there should be more explicit and transparent
arrangements for a European LOLR breaks down to the question: What extent of
ambiguity in LOLR rules is still “constructive”? There may be no doubt about
the Eurosystem having the necessary capacity and willingness to act when really
needed. And, of course it must not be too easy to forecast the final decision on
granting LOLR. However, the decision process itself has to be transparent
(Bruni and de Boissieu, 2000). In this matter, transparency is compatible with
constructive ambiguity.
19
A European observatory of systemic risk
Coming back to monitoring in a broader sense, there is a further issue that
should be considered. A supervisor should observe systemic risk in general.
Thus, with respect to the increased Europe-wide systemic risk potential there is
a need for an observatory of systemic risk at the European level (ESFRC, 1998,
Aglietta, 1999, Meister, 2000).
Simple cooperation between national supervisors even in the new framework
will not be sufficient. This task could be fulfilled by the new Financial Sector
Policy Group or a reformed Banking Supervision Committee (BSC). Such a
committee should possess power in regard to a distressed institution that
endangers the safety and soundness of the entire European financial system.
This power may either be exerted directly or through the respective national
supervisor. Furthermore, there certainly need to be close links and a proper two-
way flow of information between such a committee, the national supervisors and
also the ECB that would potentially act as a LOLR.
Besides monitoring the Europe-wide systemic risk potential, such a European
observatory of systemic risk should also ensure common supervisory and
transparency standards (Bruni and de Boissieu, 2000). Primarily, this committee
would be essential for crisis prevention. In addition, it could be valuable for
optimising the use of the LOLR when it becomes unavoidable. This task
requires tight cooperation with the LOLR, i.e. with the ECB, which speaks in
favour of the reformed BSC.
5 Conclusions
The integration of financial markets in the EU – not just since the introduction
of the euro – has increased the systemic risk potential at the European level. The
divergence between this increase in EU-wide systemic risk and the current
national based supervisory structure calls for a reform of the European
supervisory framework. A milestone in the political discussion has been a report
by the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) which will probably lay the
basis for a future supervisory structure in the EU. According to this report the
Lamfalussy framework is to be extended to the banking sector based on the
existing international agreements. The new structure aims on speeding up EU
legislation, strengthening cooperation between national supervisors, and
promoting convergence of supervisory practice.
Supervision of individual institutions is best carried out at the level closest to the
financial intermediaries concerned, i.e. the national level. However, the
increased EU-wide systemic risk calls for greater cooperation between national
supervisors. This task may be fulfilled by the new framework.
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With regard to crisis management: Although there is no explicit European
LOLR the Eurosystem can be regarded as an implicit LOLR having the
necessary capacity and willingness to act when really needed. Nevertheless,
more transparency concerning the decision process seems to be preferable and
would well be consistent with constructive ambiguity.
In addition, EU-wide systemic risk calls for a European observatory of systemic
risk. A revised and more powerful Banking Supervision Committee could fulfil
this task. Such a committee would be essential with regard to crisis prevention
and could also be valuable for optimising the use of the LOLR when it becomes
unavoidable.
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Figure 1 – EFC proposal for a new supervisory framework at the EU level
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Table A1 –Banking supervisory agencies in the EU Member States
Country Competent supervisory agency Scope of supervision Notes Web address
Austria Financial Market Authority
(Finanzmarktaufsicht, FMA)
Banking, insurance &
securities
The FMA is an independent institution
under public law, its independence is
secured by constitutional provision. The
FMA is legally required to cooperate with
the Central Bank (Oesterreichische
Nationalbank) and reports to the parliament.
www.fma.gv.at
Belgium Banking and Finance Commission
(CBF)
Banking & securities The board members of the BFC are
appointed by royal decree.
www.cbf.be
Denmark Danish Financial Supervisory
Authority (Finanstilsynet)
Banking, insurance &
securities
www.ftnet.dk
Finland Financial Supervision Authority
(FSA)
Banking & securities The FSA operates in connection with the
central bank, but is an independent decision
making organisation.
www.rata.bof.fi
France Commission Bancaire (Banque de
France, NCB)
Banking The members of the Commission Bancaire
are appointed by the Minister For Economic
Affairs, Finance, and Industry. It is chaired
by the governor of the French central bank
(Banque de France).
www.banque-
france.fr
Germany Federal Financial Supervisory
Authority (Bundesanstalt für
Finanzmarktaufsicht, BaFin)
Banking, insurance &
securities
The Bundesbank is involved in banking
supervision on behalf of the Federal
Financial Supervisory Authority.
www.bafin.de
Greece Bank of Greece (NCB) Banking www.bankofgreec
e.gr
Ireland Central Bank of Ireland (NCB) Banking & securities www.centralbank.i
e
Italy Banca d’Italia (NCB) Banking www.bancaditalia.
it
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Luxembourg Commission de Surveillance du
Secteur Financier (CSSF)
Banking & securities www.cssf.lu
The Netherlands Nederlandsche Bank (NCB) Banking www.dnb.nl
Portugal Banco de Portugal (NCB) Banking www.bportugal.pt
Spain Banco de España (NCB) Banking www.bde.es
Sweden Financial Supervisory Authority
(Finansinspektionen)
Banking, insurance &
securities
www.fi.se
United Kingdom Financial Services Authority (FSA) Banking, insurance &
securities
www.fsa.gov.uk
The information concerning the national banking supervisory agencies is taken from the respective homepages and annual reports.
